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Abstract
Financial markets are exposed to systemic risk, the risk that a substantial fraction of the system ceases to function and collapses.
Systemic risk can propagate through different mechanisms and channels of contagion. One important form of financial contagion
arises from indirect interconnections between financial institutions mediated by financial markets. This indirect interconnection
occurs when financial institutions invest in common assets and is referred to as overlapping portfolios. In this work we quantify
systemic risk from indirect interconnections between financial institutions. Having complete information of security holdings of
major Mexican financial intermediaries and the ability to uniquely identify securities in their portfolios, allows us to represent the
Mexican financial system as a bipartite network of securities and financial institutions. This makes it possible to quantify systemic
risk arising from overlapping portfolios. We show that focusing only on direct exposures underestimates total systemic risk levels
by up to 50%. By representing the financial system as a multi-layer network of direct exposures (default contagion) and indirect
exposures (overlapping portfolios) we estimate the mutual influence of different channels of contagion. The method presented here
is the first objective data-driven quantification of systemic risk on national scales that includes overlapping portfolios.
Keywords: systemic risk, overlapping portfolios, financial networks, financial regulation, multi-layer networks
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1. Introduction
Systemic risk (SR) in financial markets is the risk that a sig-
nificant fraction of the financial system can no longer perform
its function as a credit provider and collapses. In a more nar-
row sense, SR is the notion of contagion or impact that starts
from the failure of a financial institution (or a group of institu-
tions) and propagates through the financial system and poten-
tially also to the real economy (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000;
Bank for International Settlements, 2010). In a broad sense SR
also includes system-wide shocks that affect many financial in-
stitutions or markets at the same time (De Bandt and Hartmann,
2000).
SR arises through the probability of default propagating
through many different mechanisms and channels of contagion.
In addition to default contagion, financial SR arises from asset
price shocks and funding liquidity shocks (Haldane and May,
2011). Losses from asset price shocks can result in contagious
failures. Marking to market, an accounting practice of valuing
assets according to current market prices, can induce a further
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round of assets sales, depressing prices further and lead to “fire
sales” (Cifuentes et al., 2005). Liquidity hoarding in interbank
funding markets can cascade through a financial network with
severe consequences (Gai and Kapadia, 2010; Gai et al., 2011).
In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) it is shown that funding
of traders affects, and is affected by, market liquidity in a non-
trivial way. Market liquidity and funding liquidity shocks are
therefore mutually reinforcing and can lead to liquidity spirals.
An important form of financial contagion arises from indi-
rect links between financial institutions mediated by financial
markets. When financial institutions invest in the same assets,
their portfolios are said to overlap. This indirect connection
is referred to as overlapping portfolios. Contagion can oc-
cur because of shocks that cause common assets to be deval-
ued. Devaluations can cause further asset sales and devalua-
tions leading to fire sales (Cifuentes et al., 2005; Huang et al.,
2013; Corsi et al., 2013; Cont and Wagalath, 2014; Caccioli
et al., 2014, 2015). During “the Great Moderation”, a period
starting in the mid-1980s until 2007, portfolios of financial in-
stitutions became increasingly similar. For example in 2007,
before the financial crisis, many large banks around the world
held mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt
obligations (CDO) in their portfolios. During the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage crisis these banks faced together write-downs
and losses on the value of these investments. Together the losses
Preprint submitted to Elsevier February 2, 2018
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on MBS and CDOs due to the subprime mortgage crisis totaled
more than $500 billion (Bloomberg, 2012).
Financial contagion can be studied in empirical data through
the availability of high-precision financial network data. Driven
by data availability, research on financial networks has mainly
focused on default contagion: mostly, on direct lending net-
works between financial institutions (Upper and Worms, 2002;
Boss et al., 2004, 2005; Sorama¨ki et al., 2007; Iori et al., 2008;
Cajueiro et al., 2009; Bech and Atalay, 2010; Fricke and Lux,
2014; Iori et al., 2015), but also on the network of derivative
exposures (Markose et al., 2012; Markose, 2012). Research on
financial multi-layer networks, that considers multiple channels
of contagion, has only appeared recently. Poledna et al. (2015)
and Leo´n et al. (2014) study the interactions of financial insti-
tutions on different financial markets in Mexico and Colombia,
respectively. Due to the lack of empirical data, research on net-
works of overlapping portfolios is practically non existing up
to now. Caccioli et al. (2014) study two channels of contagion
by combining empirical data on direct lending with a stylized
model on overlapping portfolios. Greenwood et al. (2015) and
Duarte and Eisenbach (2015) analyze networks of common as-
set exposures in the EU and the US with aggregated data on
asset classes.
In this context several network-based SR-measures have
been proposed recently (Battiston et al., 2012; Markose et al.,
2012; Billio et al., 2012; Thurner and Poledna, 2013). These
approaches bear the notion of the systemic importance of a fi-
nancial institution within a financial network and rely on net-
work centrality measures or on closely related measures. A
serious disadvantage of centrality measures is that the corre-
sponding value for a particular institution has no clear inter-
pretation as a measure for expected losses. A breakthrough
that solves this problem is the so-called DebtRank, a recursive
method suggested by Battiston et al. (2012) that quantifies the
systemic importance of financial institutions in terms of losses
that they would contribute to the total loss in a crisis. Since
data on asset-liability networks is hard to obtain outside Cen-
tral Banks and is not publicly available, there have been several
attempts to quantify systemic importance of institutions with-
out the explicit knowledge of the underlying networks (Cooley
et al., 2009; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; Acharya et al.,
2012, 2013).
In this work we develop a novel method to quantify SR from
overlapping portfolios. First, we extend the notion of systemic
importance in financial networks to bipartite networks of fi-
nancial institutions and securities. This makes it possible to
assess SR from overlapping portfolios. Second, we compare
SR from direct exposures (default contagion) and indirect ex-
posures (overlapping portfolios). Using the methodology de-
veloped in Poledna et al. (2015), we represent the financial
system as a multi-layer network and assess SR contributions
from direct and indirect exposures. Third, we compare the
marginal contributions of individual direct and indirect expo-
sures to the overall SR. Building on the work of Poledna and
Thurner (2016) and Poledna et al. (2015), we define a novel risk
measure to quantify the expected loss due to SR that takes cas-
cading into account by explicit use of financial network topolo-
gies. We use this risk measure to quantify marginal contribu-
tions of individual direct and indirect exposures to the overall
SR.
This work is based on a unique data set containing various
types of daily exposures between the major Mexican financial
intermediaries (banks) over the period 2004-2013 (for this work
we use data from 2009-2013). The data includes detailed infor-
mation of security holdings of Mexican financial intermediaries
by containing the International Securities Identification Num-
ber (ISIN) that uniquely identifies every security. The data fur-
ther contains the capitalization of banks at every month and the
market data (pirces) for the various securities. Data were col-
lected and are owned by the Banco de Me´xico. Various aspects
of the data have been studied before (Martı´nez-Jaramillo et al.,
2010; Lo´pez-Castan˜o´n et al., 2012; Martı´nez-Jaramillo et al.,
2014; Molina-Borboa et al., 2015; Poledna et al., 2015). In this
work we focus on the SR arising from overlapping portfolios.
Having complete information of security holdings of major fi-
nancial intermediaries and the ability to uniquely identify se-
curities in the portfolios allows us to represent the Mexican fi-
nancial system as a bipartite network of securities and financial
institutions. With this data we quantify the SR contributions
of direct exposures (default contagion) and indirect exposures
(overlapping portfolios) and estimate the mutual influence of
different channels of contagion.
Our paper is structured in the following way. In section 2 we
explain the methodology to quantify systemic risk in bipartite
and multi-layer networks. In section 3 we describe the data set
used for this study. In section 4 we present the results and visu-
alize overlapping portfolios in the Mexican financial system as
a bipartite network. Finally, in section 5 we discuss the results.
2. Quantification of systemic risk from overlapping portfo-
lios
2.1. Quantification of systemic risk in bipartite networks
We represent the financial system as a bipartite network S ia
of banks and assets. A link connects bank i to asset a if a is in i’s
investment portfolio. Contagion can occur in the system when-
ever the same asset is shared by more than one bank. In this case
a bank selling off its portfolio can cause losses to other banks
with overlapping portfolios. This occurs because of market-
impact, that is the tendency of prices to move in response to
trading activity. In particular, the price of an asset is expected
to drop by an amount that depends on the size of the position
that is liquidated. It is then clear that banks with similar port-
folios are mutually exposed even if there are no direct linkages
between them (in form of e.g. interbank lending). A correct as-
sessment of systemic risk should account for the stress imposed
on the system by assets liquidation.
We address this problem by considering a modification of
DebtRank for bipartite networks, a methodology recently intro-
duced to identify systemically important banks in a network of
mutual exposures (Battiston et al., 2012). It is a quantity that
measures the fraction of the total economic value V in the net-
work that is potentially affected by the distress of an individual
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node (bank) i, or by a set of nodes S . The DebtRank of a set of
nodes S that is initially in distress is denoted by RS . In those
cases where only one node i is initially under distress (the set S
contains only one node i) we denote the DebtRank of that node
by Ri. For details see Appendix A.
DebtRanks can be calculated from any financial network rep-
resenting financial interdependencies (Poledna et al., 2015). Al-
though different financial interdependencies are associated with
different types of financial risk, the interdependencies can be
represented by an exposure network. We use the following no-
tation for different exposure types: the size of every exposure
of type α of institution i to institution j at time t is given by
the matrix element Xαi j(t). α = 1, 2 labels the layers “direct ex-
posures,” and “indirect exposures” respectively. DebtRank of
layer α is given by Rαi (t) = R
α
i (t)(X
α
i j(t),Ci(t), v
α
i (t)) with v
α
i (t)
as the respective economic value of layer α at time t. The links
between nodes have the same meaning for all financial interde-
pendencies: it is the total loss that might arise for a bank as the
consequence of the default of another. The concept and dimen-
sion (dollars) of exposure is the same for all links: it is the total
loss that one institution would suffer if a given counterparty de-
faulted.
We develop a modification of DebtRank for bipartite net-
works starting with extending the notion of direct exposures to
indirect exposures that arise from overlapping portfolios. Let us
consider a network of b banks and m assets, and let us denote
its equity by Ci, the number of shares of asset a owned by bank
i by S ia, the total number of outstanding shares of asset a by
Na, and the price of asset a by pa respectively. For simplicity
we omit the time arguments t for the remainder of the section.
As a measure of the direct impact of banks on assets we de-
fine the matrix
W ′ia =
S ia
Na
, (1)
i.e. we assume the impact of bank i on asset a is proportional to
the fraction of shares owned by the bank.
Alternatively, we incorporate absorption effects of financial
markets into our analysis. When a bank fails, financial markets
may have a limited capacity to absorb assets which are sold.
Following Schnabel and Shin (2004), Cifuentes et al. (2005)
and Gai and Kapadia (2010), the price of an asset, p, is given
by
p = e−αx , (2)
where x > 0 is the fraction of the assets sold onto the market
(if assets are not being sold onto the market, p = 1). α may
be calibrated so that e.g. the asset price falls by 10% when one
tenth of assets has been sold. To incorporate absorption effects
into our analysis, we change eq. (1) to
W ′′ia = 1 − e−αW
′
ia . (3)
Note that with eq. (3), XOPi j can no longer be defined as the
weighted bank projection of the bipartite network of banks and
assets S ia. XOPi j defined with eq. (3) is therefore, in general, not
symmetrical.
With the direct impact of banks on assets, we define the in-
direct exposure of bank i to bank j from overlapping portfolios
as
XOPi j =
∑
a
W ′ja paS ai =
∑
a
pa
Na
S iaS a j, (4)
where W ′ja is the impact of bank j on assets a and paS ai is the
current value of assets a in i’s investment portfolio. That is, we
assume the impact of bank i on bank j is proportional to the
impact of bank j on assets a and to the current value of assets a
in i’s investment portfolio.
Note that XOPi j is the appropriately weighted bank projection
of the weighted bipartite network of banks and assets S ia. As-
suming the impact of bank i on asset a is proportional to the
fraction of shares owned by the bank, XOPi j is symmetrical and
the diagonal elements are non-zero, even though the bipartite
network itself has, by definition, no self-loops. Diagonal ele-
ments represent the self-inflicted loss of a bank from (rapidly)
liquidating its portfolio (market impact). This loss will be high
if bank i holds a large fraction of asset a in its portfolio, and is
negligible if i holds only a small fraction of asset a.
To consider contagion from asset liquidation we calculate the
DebtRank of the indirect exposure network XOPi j ,
ROPi := R
OP
i (X
OP
i j ,Ci, v
OP
i ) (5)
where Ci is i’s equity and vOPi i’s economic value. Given the
current value of assets a in i’s investment portfolio, we define
its economic value as
vOPi =
∑
a paS ia∑
j
∑
a paS ja
, (6)
i.e. the fraction of i’s investment portfolio from the total in-
vestment portfolios of all banks. Note that if
∑
i S ia = Na, the
definition of the economic value in eq. (6) is equal to the defi-
nition in eq. (A.2).
ROPi measures the fraction of the total economic value (V
OP =∑
i
∑
a paS ia) that is affected by the distress of a bank i from
indirect exposure, i.e. from overlapping portfolios.
2.2. Quantification of systemic risk in multi-layer networks
We consider direct exposures and indirect exposures in the
framework of a multi-layer network of exposure networks. In
our case we study a multi-layer network consisting of two lay-
ers: direct exposures and indirect exposures. Direct exposures
represent financial exposures from holding “deposits & loans”
(DL), “derivatives” (deri), “securities” (secu), and “foreign ex-
change” (FX). Indirect exposures result from overlapping port-
folios as defined in eq. (4).
DebtRank values can also be computed for multi-layer net-
works (Poledna et al., 2015). Specifically, DebtRank values
can be computed for each layer of a multi-layer network sep-
arately, or for all layers combined (from the combined expo-
sure network Xcombi j =
∑
α Xαi j). We refer to the DebtRank of
the combined exposure network as Rcombi and the total eco-
nomic value of the combined exposure network is given by
Vcomb =
∑
α Vα = Vdirect + VOP.
To allow a comparison of Rαi between different layers, R
α
i
must be shown as a percentage of the combined total economic
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value Vcomb. The normalized DebtRank for layer α is therefore
defined in (Poledna et al., 2015) as
Rˆαi =
Vα
Vcomb
Rαi , (7)
where Vα is the respective total economic value of layer α.
2.3. Quantification of systemic risk at the country level
Using the methodology developed in Poledna et al. (2015),
we estimate systemic risk at the country level. The SR-profile
of a country is defined as the rank-ordered normalized Deb-
tRank Rˆαi for all financial institutions in a country. The SR-
profile shows the distribution of systemic importance across in-
stitutions throughout a country. The institution with the high-
est systemic importance is shown to the very left. The average
DebtRank is used to capture the SR of the entire economy (with
b institutions),
R¯α =
1
b
b∑
i=1
Rˆαi . (8)
For the combined network, Rˆαi is replaced by R
comb
i , and we
write R¯comb for the combined average DebtRank. Note that R¯α
depends on the network topology of the various layers (or the
combined network) only and is independent of default proba-
bilities, recovery rates, or other variables.
The precise meaning of the DebtRank as the fraction of the
total economic value in a network also allows us to define of the
expected systemic loss for the entire economy, which is the size
of the loss, multiplied by the probability of that loss occurring
(Poledna and Thurner, 2016). Taking into account all possi-
ble combinations of defaulting and surviving institutions and
by assuming independent equal loss probabilities of individual
institutions, the expected loss for an economy of b institutions
can be written as a combinatorial expression
ELsyst = V
∑
S∈P(B)
∏
i∈S
pi
∏
j∈B\S
(1 − p j) RS , (9)
where pi is the probability of default of institution i, and (1− p j)
the survival probability of j, P(B) is the powerset of the set of
financial institutions B, and RS is the DebtRank of the set S of
nodes initially in distress. The DebtRank of the empty set of
nodes initially in distress R∅ is defined to be zero.
It is immediately clear that eq. (9) is computationally feasible
only for situations with relative small number of financial insti-
tutions. Computing the powerset and calculating DebtRanks
for all possible combinations of large financial networks is not
feasible. In Poledna et al. (2015) a practical approximation for
eq. (9) was derived,
ELsyst ≈ V
b∑
i=1
pi Ri , (10)
which is perfectly valid if the default probabilities are small
(pi  1), and/or the interconnectedness is low (Ri ≈ vi). For
details see Poledna et al. (2015).
2.4. Quantification of systemic risk of individual exposures
Following Poledna and Thurner (2016) and Poledna et al.
(2015), we estimate the marginal SR of individual daily expo-
sures. In particular we compare single exposures of a given size
to their marginal SR. The marginal SR of an individual expo-
sure, ∆Xkl (matrix with precisely one nonzero element for the
exposure between k and l) on ELsyst is the difference of total
expected systemic loss,
∆ELsyst
∣∣∣∣∣
∆Xkl
=
b∑
i=1
pi
[
V(Xi j + ∆Xkl) Ri(Xi j + ∆Xkl,Ci)
−V(Xi j) Ri(Xi j,Ci)
]
, (11)
where Ri(Xi j + ∆Xkl,Ci) is the DebtRank and V(Xi j + ∆Xkl) the
total economic value of the exposure network without the spe-
cific exposure ∆Xkl. Clearly, a positive ∆ELsyst means that the
change in exposures ∆Xkl increases total SR. In general, this
risk is borne by the public.
3. Data
The data used for this work is derived from a database on
exposures at the Mexican Central Bank, built and operated
with the specific purpose of studying contagion and SR. This
database is maintained by the statistics unit at the financial
stability general directorate at this institution. The statistics
unit under the financial stability general directorate at Banco
de Mexico gathers information and cross-validates it by using
daily, weekly and monthly regulatory reports, which are used
for regulatory and supervisory purposes. An illustrative and
important example is the case of the daily regulatory reports
known as ‘operaciones de captacio´n e interbancarias en mon-
eda nacional y udis’ (OCIMN), and ‘operaciones de captacio´n
e interbancarias en moneda extranjera’ (OCIME). These reports
contain every single funding transaction on a daily basis in lo-
cal and foreign currency, which are used to compute the daily
funding costs for each bank. From these two regulatory re-
ports it is possible to compute the exact daily unsecured ex-
posures between banks, as well as more broadly, those between
financial institutions like investment banks, brokerage houses,
mutual funds and pension funds. In Solorzano-Margain et al.
(2013), a stress testing study was carried out using an (extended
set) of these exposures. Given the confidential nature of these
transactions, data is kept under strict access control and can
only be used for regulatory, supervisory and financial stability
purposes.
The present work is based on transaction data that is con-
verted to bilateral exposures. Direct and indirect exposures are
obtained in the following way.
3.1. Direct exposures
This paper uses data owned by the central bank which com-
prises exposures arising from different markets and transac-
tions. From this data it is possible to compute gross exposures.
The risks considered for building the exposures database in-
clude: issuer risk, counterparty risk, credit risk and settlement
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risk. To compute direct exposures related to issuer risk, infor-
mation on securities holdings is used. The same information
is also used to compute indirect exposures as will be explained
later. To compute counterparty risk information on net posi-
tions from repos and derivatives is used. The credit risk com-
ponent is computed by using data on unsecured deposits and
loans. Finally, the settlement risk component is computed by
using data on foreign exchange transactions. In most of the
previous works, the only type of exposures which were consid-
ered was on the unsecured interbank market; nevertheless, this
has changed and more jurisdictions are extending the informa-
tion on the types of exposures in order to perform contagion
risk studies. In the Mexican case, the most important type of
exposures in terms of amount and SR are exposures that are re-
lated to issuer risk, i.e., exposures related to the cross holdings
of securities among banks.
3.2. Indirect exposures
The data used for the indirect exposures comes from a
database that contains the daily position on securities of each
bank and brokerage house. For each day it is possible to de-
termine exactly which securities are held by each bank at the
level of individual security and the exact number of them. The
number of outstanding securities can be computed; the market
price is also obtained from the database.
Banks hold several types of securities: securities issued by
non-bank companies, securities issued by commercial and de-
velopment banks. Given the unique security ID, which is part
of the database, we can obtain information on the currency in
which the security was issued, the issuer and the number of
securities issued. Further information on the specific charac-
teristics of each security, like maturity, coupon type, coupon
payments, etc. is available. With this information we represent
the financial system as the bipartite network S ia(t) of banks and
assets at a particular day t. The dimensions of the bipartite net-
work vary depending on the number of of outstanding securities
held by banks on a particular day.
The vector of prices pa(t) for the securities is obtained form a
database at the Mexican central bank which includes also other
relevant aspects for each security. This database is used to com-
pute the number securities issued for each asset ID.
Finally, balance sheet data on 43 Mexican banks under study
is also available, in particular the capitalization, measured on a
monthly scale.
4. Results
4.1. Overlapping portfolios in the Mexican banking system
In fig. 1 we visualize overlapping portfolios in the Mexican
financial system as a bipartite network. Nodes in the bipartite
network represent banks (blue) and assets (red). Links between
an asset and a bank exist if a bank holds the asset in its portfolio.
Figure 2 shows different layers of exposure of the Mexican
financial system. The network of direct exposures from deriva-
tives, foreign exchange exposures, and deposits & loans is seen
in the top layer (fig. 2(a)). Nodes are shown at the same position
in all layers. Node size represents the size of banks in terms of
total assets. Nodes i are colored according to their systemic im-
portance, as measured by the DebtRank, Rαi (t), in the respective
layer (see section 2.2). Systemically important banks are red;
unimportant ones are green. The width of links represents the
size of the exposures in the layer; link color is the same as the
counterparty’s node color (DebtRank).
Figure 2(b) shows the network of indirect exposures from
overlapping portfolios XOPi j (t) visualized as the bank-projection
of the bipartite network S ia(t) of banks and assets shown in
fig. 1. Diagonal elements represent the loss for a bank itself
from liquidating its portfolio and are typically larger than the
indirect exposure to other banks with similar portfolios, as can
be seen in fig. 2(b).
The total exposure from overlapping portfolios is about three
times larger (
∑
i, j XOPi j (t) ≈ 1 × 1012 Mex$) than the direct ex-
posures (
∑
i, j Xdirecti j (t) ≈ 3.3× 1011 Mex$). In fig. 2(c) we show
the combined exposures Xcombi j (t) = X
direct
i j (t) + X
OP
i j (t).
Figure 3(a) shows the SR-profile for the combined exposures
Rcombi (line) and stacked for different layers Rˆ
α
i (colored bars).
Clearly, the SR contribution from direct exposures is smaller
than the contributions from indirect exposures. The DebtRank
of the combined layers (line) is always larger than the sum of
the layers separately, Rcombi >
∑
α Rˆαi .
Figure 3(b) shows the daily average DebtRank R¯ from
31 July 2008 to 30 September 2013 for the different layers
(stacked) and from the combined network (line). As in fig. 3(a)
the DebtRank of the combined layers is always larger than the
combination of the layers separately and the SR contribution
from direct exposures is smaller than the contributions from in-
direct exposures. The contributions of the exposure types are
more or less constant over time.
In fig. 4 we compare the marginal SR of direct and indirect
individual exposures with the exposure size. Every direct and
indirect individual exposure between banks is represented by a
data point. The different layers are distinguished by colors. The
marginal SR of individual exposures depend not only on the two
parties involved, but also on the conditions of all nodes in the
network. Note that the marginal SR of small and medium-size
exposures varies by three orders of magnitude.
5. Discussion
To a large extent SR arises from indirect interconnections
between financial institutions mediated by financial markets.
These indirect interconnections occur when financial institu-
tions invest in common assets and are referred to as overlap-
ping portfolios. This work provides, to our knowledge, the first
empirical study of systemic risk arising from overlapping port-
folios with uniquely identified securities. By having complete
information of security holdings of major Mexican financial in-
termediaries and the ability to uniquely identify securities in
their portfolios we represent the Mexican financial system as a
bipartite network of securities and financial institutions. In this
study we consider overlapping portfolios from securities issued
5
Figure 1: Bank-asset bipartite network of the Mexican financial system. Nodes in the network represent banks (blue) and assets (red). Links between an asset and a
bank exist if the bank holds the asset in its portfolio.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Xdirect
XOP
Xcomb
Figure 2: Multi-layer banking network of Mexico. (a) network of direct expo-
sures from derivatives Xderii j (t), foreign exchange exposures X
FX
i j (t) and deposits
& loans XDLi j (t), (b) network of indirect exposures from overlapping portfolios
XOPi j (t), (c) combined banking network X
comb
i j (t). The network of indirect expo-
sures is the bank-projection of the bipartite network S ia(t) of banks and assets.
Nodes (banks) are colored according to their systemic importance Rαi in the
respective layer (see section 2.2): from systemically important banks (red) to
systemically safe (green). Node size represents banks’ total assets. Link width
is the exposure size between banks (re-scaled), link color is taken from the
counterparty.
Figure 3: (a) SR profile for the different layers. Normalized DebtRank Rˆαi (see
section 2.2) from different layers are stacked for each bank. Banks are ordered
according to their DebtRank in the combined network from all layers (line).
(b) Time series for the average DebtRank R¯α(t) = 1b
∑b
i=1 Rˆ
α
i (t) for all layers
from 31 July 2008 to 30 September 2013. The black line shows the average
DebtRank for all layers combined R¯comb(t) = 1b
∑b
i=1 R
comb
i (t).
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Figure 4: Marginal increase of expected systemic loss, ∆ELsyst, versus exposure
size, for individual direct and indirect exposures between institutions. Every
data point represents an individual exposure ∆Xαkl on a given layer. Every direct
and indirect individual exposure between banks is represented by a data point.
The marginal SR of individual exposures depends not only on the two parties
involved, but also on the conditions of all nodes in the network.
by non-bank companies and securities issued by commercial
and development banks (government bonds are excluded).
By generalising DebtRank, a methodology recently intro-
duced to identify systemically important banks in a network
of mutual exposures (Battiston et al., 2012), for bipartite net-
works we extend the notion of systemic importance in financial
networks to bipartite networks of financial institutions and se-
curities. This makes it possible to assess SR from overlapping
portfolios. Similar to fire sales models we assume a linear price
impact, which captures the spirit of most theoretical models of
fire sales (Greenwood et al., 2015). Alternatively, we incorpo-
rate absorption effects of financial markets into our analysis.
Finally, by representing the financial system as a multi-layer
network of direct exposures (default contagion) and indirect ex-
posures (overlapping portfolios), we estimate the mutual influ-
ence of different channels of contagion. We show that focusing
only on direct exposures underestimates total systemic risk lev-
els by up to 50%.
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Appendix A. DebtRank
DebtRank is a recursive method suggested in Battiston et al.
(2012) to determine the systemic importance of nodes in finan-
cial networks. It is a number measuring the fraction of the total
economic value in the network that is potentially affected by the
distress of a node or a set of nodes. For simplicity’s sake let us
think of the nodes in financial networks as banks. Xi j denotes
the exposure network at any given moment (loans of bank j to
bank i), and Ci is the capital of bank i. If bank i defaults and
cannot repay its loans, bank j loses the loans Xi j. If j does not
have enough capital available to cover the loss, j also defaults.
The impact of bank i on bank j (in case of a default of i) is
therefore defined as
Wi j = min
[
1,
Xi j
C j
]
. (A.1)
The value of the impact of bank i on its neighbors is Ii =∑
j Wi jv j. The impact is measured by the economic value vi
of bank i. Given the total outstanding interbank exposures of
bank i, Xi =
∑
j X ji, its economic value is defined as
vi = Xi/
∑
j
X j . (A.2)
To take into account the impact of nodes at distance two and
higher, this has to be computed recursively. If the network
Wi j contains cycles, the impact can exceed one. To avoid this
problem an alternative was suggested in Battiston et al. (2012),
where two state variables, hi(t) and si(t), are assigned to each
node. hi is a continuous variable between zero and one; si is
a discrete state variable for three possible states, undistressed
(U), distressed (D), and inactive (I), si ∈ {U,D, I}. For a finan-
cial networks with B nodes, the initial conditions with S ⊆ B
nodes initially in distress are hi(1) = Ψ ,∀i ∈ S ; hi(1) = 0 ,∀i <
S , and si(1) = D ,∀i ∈ S ; si(1) = U ,∀i < S (parameter Ψ
quantifies the initial level of distress: Ψ ∈ [0, 1], with Ψ = 1
meaning default). The dynamics of hi is then specified by
hi(t) = min
1, hi(t − 1) + ∑
j|s j(t−1)=D
W jih j(t − 1)
 . (A.3)
The sum extends over these j, for which s j(t − 1) = D,
si(t) =

D if hi(t) > 0; si(t − 1) , I,
I if si(t − 1) = D,
si(t − 1) otherwise .
(A.4)
The DebtRank of the set S (set of nodes in distress at time 1), is
R′S =
∑
j h j(T )v j −∑ j h j(1)v j, and measures the distress in the
system, excluding the initial distress. If S is a single node, the
DebtRank measures its systemic importance on the network.
The DebtRank of S containing only the single node i is
R′i =
∑
j
h j(T )v j − hi(1)vi . (A.5)
The DebtRank, as defined in eq. (A.5), excludes the loss gener-
ated directly by the default of the node itself and measures only
the impact on the rest of the system through default contagion.
For some purposes, however, it is useful to include the direct
loss of a default of i as well. The total loss caused by the set of
nodes S in distress at time 1, including the initial distress is
RS =
∑
j
h j(T )v j . (A.6)
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